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So, some days ago I finished that book. Southeast Asia: An illustrated introductory history, by Milton Osborne (first written 1979, 1990 this edition). Was it good? Well, I learned a fair bit, and it was an easy read. There was a lot of "well, it's complicated" cautions and handwringing, which I thought became redundant, and there often felt like there was a critical shortage. Worth reading if you run across it and don't know much about the history of the region, but not worth uniquely seeking out vs. other books... not that I know anything about its competition.
I last mentioned the book regarding the 1930s and the different ideologies feeding various incipient nationalisms. The next chapter is about how the Japanese advanced the cause of nationalism and independence. "What?" I hear you say. Yes, well, it wasn't that Japanese *intention*. But consider what Japanese conquest meant: most dramatically, it meant the White Man getting his ass royally kicked with surprising speed and humiliation. It even surprised the Japanese, but things like this might help explain:
Things like this make me wonder if the Flynn Effect really *does* mean that many of our ancestors were, well, retarded... There was also confidence that the Japanese couldn't conquer Malaya because the British could hold the roads and no one could go through the jungle, which of course the Japanese did. Anyway, by mid-1942, they'd swept the region, with the nominal exception of French Indochina -- in a situation disturbingly reminiscent of Vichy France, it was administered by the French, but everyone knew that was at the pleasure of the Japanese -- and the more real exception of Thailand, who traded independence but submission to the white colonial powers to independence and submission to the Japanese, who got to the use the territory somewhat but weren't In Charge the way they were elsewhere.
Effects on nationalism? As mentioned, "white superiority" was pretty busted. Lots of symbolic or emotional advances: the "Asia for Asians" rhetoric of the Japanese, their encouraging/using Burmese nationalists for a while, their releasing Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno from prison, and allowing open use of the flag and independence songs. In Malaya they treated the sultans with respect if not power, and used more Indians in their administration; the Chinese, OTOH, got slaughtered, there and elsewhere. Brutality in the Philippines encouraged allegiance with the banished Americans, who'd already been nudging towards independence. Vietnam saw the Communists building broad support for resisting both the French and Japanese. Laos and Cambodia... well, not much there.
Then there was the period of rollback and defeat. Mountbatten happily cooperated with the disappointed Burmese nationalists, paving the way for independence there. Indonesian nationalists tried getting the Japanese to give them independence before the war's end and Dutch return, and declared independence on 17 Aug 1945, followed by fighting off the British who were trying to pave the way for the Dutch. By 1949, with a lot of negotiation and some fighting and some nudges of the Dutch by the US, independence was achieved there. In Vietnam, the Japanese had taken full control near the end, accelerating the efforts of the Viet Minh, who declared independence as the Japanese withdrew. The French proved less flexible than the Dutch, though, and it took 9 more years and lots of fighting before independence was achieved -- and in this case, of course, the Americans would act to prop up the state the French had thrown together in the south in the name ofcancelling elections the Communists would win democracy.
The Malaysian path to independence isn't well-described, though there's mention of the Emergency, fighting against a Communist insurgency -- which, being almost entirely Chinese, doesn't seem like it had a real chance, unlike the Viet Minh (majority group and the dominant social power) or the Philippine Huks (Philippino, and big fighters against the Japanese, unlike elite collaborators, though ultimately unable to overcome social inertial in favor of their idea of social justice.) Laos and Cambodia had been "sleepy" until now, but 1946 saw the Pathet Lao, started by a radical Laotian prince, picking up the Communist banner for independence. And, well, Laos is landlocked; once they gave up in Vietnam, the French probably had little interest in laos. Sihanouk in Camboida pressed for independence, getting it in 1953, again as a side effect of Vietnam, so while there were Communists there yet, the Viet Minh can take credit for the whole region. Why the world's most radical Communists ended up taking over Cambodia 22 years later is something Osborne finds murky, but he brings up Sihanouk leaving little room for dissenting policies, leading to violent resistance, American invasion and Vietnamese response, widespread brutality on left and right (and from the air, in US bombing) -- all perhaps leading to radicalism and a sense of urgency regarding "social transformation" once the Khmer Rouge got power. But "more research is needed".
The book ends with first a short chapter on "modern problems" in SE Asia, including the usual shocking population growth curve, and a note that freedom from colonialism and war hasn't left Thailand dramatically better off. (Well, it *is* notably better off in GDP/capita than most of its neighbors, but not Malaysia, and even that's no South Korea. Life expectancy is better, but then so are others, including Vietnam above Malaysia). And the final chapter is a big surprise for such a historical birth: on the art of SE Asia, and novels about the region whether native or Western.
I last mentioned the book regarding the 1930s and the different ideologies feeding various incipient nationalisms. The next chapter is about how the Japanese advanced the cause of nationalism and independence. "What?" I hear you say. Yes, well, it wasn't that Japanese *intention*. But consider what Japanese conquest meant: most dramatically, it meant the White Man getting his ass royally kicked with surprising speed and humiliation. It even surprised the Japanese, but things like this might help explain:
The Japanese, it had been confidently asserted in the 1930s, could not become adequate pilots because of an alleged national disposition to weak eyesight.
Things like this make me wonder if the Flynn Effect really *does* mean that many of our ancestors were, well, retarded... There was also confidence that the Japanese couldn't conquer Malaya because the British could hold the roads and no one could go through the jungle, which of course the Japanese did. Anyway, by mid-1942, they'd swept the region, with the nominal exception of French Indochina -- in a situation disturbingly reminiscent of Vichy France, it was administered by the French, but everyone knew that was at the pleasure of the Japanese -- and the more real exception of Thailand, who traded independence but submission to the white colonial powers to independence and submission to the Japanese, who got to the use the territory somewhat but weren't In Charge the way they were elsewhere.
Effects on nationalism? As mentioned, "white superiority" was pretty busted. Lots of symbolic or emotional advances: the "Asia for Asians" rhetoric of the Japanese, their encouraging/using Burmese nationalists for a while, their releasing Indonesian nationalists such as Sukarno from prison, and allowing open use of the flag and independence songs. In Malaya they treated the sultans with respect if not power, and used more Indians in their administration; the Chinese, OTOH, got slaughtered, there and elsewhere. Brutality in the Philippines encouraged allegiance with the banished Americans, who'd already been nudging towards independence. Vietnam saw the Communists building broad support for resisting both the French and Japanese. Laos and Cambodia... well, not much there.
Then there was the period of rollback and defeat. Mountbatten happily cooperated with the disappointed Burmese nationalists, paving the way for independence there. Indonesian nationalists tried getting the Japanese to give them independence before the war's end and Dutch return, and declared independence on 17 Aug 1945, followed by fighting off the British who were trying to pave the way for the Dutch. By 1949, with a lot of negotiation and some fighting and some nudges of the Dutch by the US, independence was achieved there. In Vietnam, the Japanese had taken full control near the end, accelerating the efforts of the Viet Minh, who declared independence as the Japanese withdrew. The French proved less flexible than the Dutch, though, and it took 9 more years and lots of fighting before independence was achieved -- and in this case, of course, the Americans would act to prop up the state the French had thrown together in the south in the name of
The Malaysian path to independence isn't well-described, though there's mention of the Emergency, fighting against a Communist insurgency -- which, being almost entirely Chinese, doesn't seem like it had a real chance, unlike the Viet Minh (majority group and the dominant social power) or the Philippine Huks (Philippino, and big fighters against the Japanese, unlike elite collaborators, though ultimately unable to overcome social inertial in favor of their idea of social justice.) Laos and Cambodia had been "sleepy" until now, but 1946 saw the Pathet Lao, started by a radical Laotian prince, picking up the Communist banner for independence. And, well, Laos is landlocked; once they gave up in Vietnam, the French probably had little interest in laos. Sihanouk in Camboida pressed for independence, getting it in 1953, again as a side effect of Vietnam, so while there were Communists there yet, the Viet Minh can take credit for the whole region. Why the world's most radical Communists ended up taking over Cambodia 22 years later is something Osborne finds murky, but he brings up Sihanouk leaving little room for dissenting policies, leading to violent resistance, American invasion and Vietnamese response, widespread brutality on left and right (and from the air, in US bombing) -- all perhaps leading to radicalism and a sense of urgency regarding "social transformation" once the Khmer Rouge got power. But "more research is needed".
The book ends with first a short chapter on "modern problems" in SE Asia, including the usual shocking population growth curve, and a note that freedom from colonialism and war hasn't left Thailand dramatically better off. (Well, it *is* notably better off in GDP/capita than most of its neighbors, but not Malaysia, and even that's no South Korea. Life expectancy is better, but then so are others, including Vietnam above Malaysia). And the final chapter is a big surprise for such a historical birth: on the art of SE Asia, and novels about the region whether native or Western.
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Date: 2008-11-25 17:38 (UTC)From: